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Balkans, Economies of the Macedonia is a useful microcosm of the post-communist countries of the Balkan (self-importantly renamed by its denizens "Southeast Europe"). Prodded by its pro-Western president, Boris Trajkovski, it vocally - though implausibly - aspires to NATO and European Union membership. Its socialist prime minister - newly-elected in a remarkably smooth transfer of power - has just inked a landmark "social contract" with the trade unions. Macedonia boasts of being an island of modernity and stability in an otherwise volatile (and backward) region. Indeed, in a sign of the times, Macedonian cellphones were rendered Internet-enabled this month Mobimak, one of the two providers of wireless communications services. Yet, Macedonia's nationalist opposition boycotts both parliament and the peace process launched by the Ohrid Framework Agreement in August last year. Macedonia's biggest minority, the Albanians - at least 30 percent of its population, as a recently concluded census should reveal, unless blatantly tampered with - are again restless. Though an erstwhile group of terrorists (or "freedom fighters") made it to the legislature and the government, splinter factions threaten to reignite last year's civil war. Inter-ethnic hostilities are in the cards. The country's new government, egged on by a worried international community, has embarked on an unprecedented spree of arrests intended to visibly combat a paralyzing wave of corruption and crime. Several privatization deals were annulled as well. Regrettably, though quite predictably, this newfound righteous zeal is aimed only at the functionaries and politicians of the opposition which constituted the former government. In the meantime, Macedonia's economy is in tatters. At least one quarter of its population is below the poverty line. Unemployment is an unsustainable 31 percent. The trade deficit - c. $800 million - is a shocking 28 percent of its puny gross domestic product. Macedonia survives largely on charity, aid and loans doled out by weary donors, multilateral financing institutions and friendly countries. It is slated to sign yet another IMF standby agreement this coming February. And this is the situation throughout most of the region. Macedonia is no forlorn exception - it is the poignant rule. Flurries of grandiose meetings, self-congratulatory conferences and interminable conventions between the desperate leaders of this benighted corner of Europe fail to disguise this hopeless prognosis. Decrepit infrastructure, a debilitating brain drain, venal and obstructive bureaucracies, all-pervasive kleptocracies, dysfunctional institutions, reviving enmities, shoddy treatment of minorities and a reigning sense of fatalistic resignation - are cross-border phenomena. International commitment to the entire region is dwindling. The British, German and American contingents within NATO intend to withdraw forces from Bosnia and Kosovo next year. Aid to refugees in Kosovo and Croatia may cease altogether as cash allotted to the United Nation's for this purpose has dried up. Both Serbia and Montenegro have endured botched presidential elections. Disenchantment with much-derided politics and much-decried politicians is evident in the abysmally low turnout in all the recent rounds of voting. Tensions are growing as Yugoslavia is again slipping into a constitutional crisis. The new union of Serbia and Montenegro is a recipe for instability and constant friction. A lackluster economy doesn't help - industrial production has nudged up by an imperceptible 2.5 percent from a vanishingly low basis. Political and economic transformations are likely to stall in Yugoslavia as nationalism reasserts itself and the reform camp disintegrates. Solemn mutual declarations of peace and prosperity notwithstanding, tension with neighboring countries - notably Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina - will flare up. Despite some private sector dynamism and the appearance of law and order, Kosovo's unemployment rate is an impossible 57 percent and more than half of its destitute inhabitants survive beneath the poverty line. Its status unresolved and with diminishing international profile, it fails to attract the massive flows of foreign investment needed merely to maintain its utilities and mines. It is a veritable powder keg adjacent to a precariously balanced Macedonia. Bosnians of all designations are rearming as well. The country has become a center of human trafficking, illicit weapons trading, smuggling and worse. The IMF, the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are doing their best to resuscitate the moribund economy, but hitherto to little avail. The World Bank alone is expected to plough $102 million into the ailing economy. A dearth of foreign investment and decreasing foreign aid leave the ramshackle country exposed to a soaring balance of payments deficit. Albanians are busy putting their crumbling house in order. The customs service is revamped in collaboration with concerned neighbors such as Italy. Transport infrastructure will connect Albania to Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia and even Yugoslavia. Albania's air control system will be modernized next year. Still, a sapping budget deficit of almost 7 percent of GDP ties the government's hands. Indeed, infrastructural projects represent the Balkan's Great White Hope. Transport corridors will crisscross the region and connect Bulgaria to Macedonia, Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia and Hungary. A Balkan-wide electricity grid is in the works and might even solve the chronic shortages in countries such as Albania. Yet, not all is grim. The Balkan is clearly segmented. On the one hand, countries like Macedonia, Albania, Yugoslavia and Bosnia seem to be cruelly doomed to a Sisyphean repetition of their conflicts and the destitution they entail. Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania, on the other hand, are either EU candidates or would be members. Slovenia - though it vehemently denies its regional affiliation - would be the first Balkan country to join the European Union in May 2004. Romania and Bulgaria are slated to follow it in 2007. So much of Croatia's economy - especially its banking system - is in European hands that it is a de facto EU member, if far from being a de jure one. It, too, relies on IMF financing, though - the latest $140 million standby arrangement was just initialed. Croatia's external debt is out of control and it needs all the foreign exchange it can lay its hands on. Labor unrest is growing and likely to mushroom in the dark winter months ahead - despite impressive strides in industrial production, up 10 percent year on year in November. Additionally, Croatia is intimately linked to the German market. It is an important export market for its goods and services (such as construction). Should the German economy stagnate, the Croats may suffer a recession. Relationships with Slovenia are not too improved either. Several rounds of incendiary verbiage were exchanged between these uneasy neighbors over the fate of money owed to Croats by Slovenian banks and a co-owned nuclear facility. These - and trade issues - will be satisfactorily resolved next year. Bulgaria has descended from euphoria, upon the success of the Simeon II National Movement in the June 2001 elections, to unmitigated gloom. It is besieged by scandals, skyrocketing energy prices, a totteringly balanced - albeit IMF sanctioned - budget, a growing current account deficit, surging unemployment and a privatization process in suspended animation. Next year will be better, though: the telecoms, the electricity utility and its regional branches, the State Savings Bank and tobacco firms are likely to be disposed of, sold to consortia of foreign - mainly Greek - and domestic investors. GDP is already growing at a respectable annual clip of 4.5 percent. Public debt declined by 15 percent in the last 4 years. Households' real income and consumption will both continue their double digit takeoff. Moody's recently upgraded the country's credit rating to "positive" and Standard and Poor followed suit and elevated the rank of four local banks. Next year's big positive surprises - and erstwhile miscarriages - share a common language: Romanian. Romania's NATO membership in 2003 will seal the astounding turnaround of this bleak country. Almost two thirds of its burgeoning trade is already with the EU. Unemployment dropped by a significant 2.4 percent this year. Some commentators foresee a snap election in the first half of the year to capitalize on these achievements, but this is unlikely. Recently, the IMF has unblocked funds, though reluctantly. This time, though, Romania will keep its promises to the Fund and implement a rigorous austerity and enterprise reform package despite the vigorous opposition of unionized labor and assorted virulent nationalists assembled in the Greater Romania Party. The tax system is already rationalized - corporate tax is down to 25 percent and a value added tax was introduced. The government currently consumes merely 6 percent of GDP. Privatization proceeds have shot up - admittedly from a dismal starting point. The Ministry of Tourism alone enjoyed an influx of $40 million of foreign direct investment. Some major properties - such as Romtelecom - will go on the block next year. Both Moody's and the Japan Credit Rating Agency have upgraded the credit ratings of the country and its banks. GDP is predicted by the Economist Intelligence Unit to grow by 4.6 percent next year and by a hefty 5 percent in 2004. In purchasing power parity terms, it is already up 20 percent on 1998. Foreign exchange reserves have doubled since 1998 to c. $6 billion. Even Moldova is affected by the positive spill-over and has considerably improved its ties with the IMF. It is pursuing restructuring and market-orientated reforms. It may succeed to reschedule its Paris Club debts next year. The United States - the country's largest donor - will likely increase its contribution from the current $44 million. The Moldovan president met United States President George Bush last week and came out assured of American support. The Balkan in 2003 will be an immeasurably better place than its was in 1993, both politically and economically. Still, progress has been patchy and unevenly divided. Some countries have actually regressed. Others seem to be stuck in a time warp. A few have authentically broken with their past. While only five years ago it would have been safe to lump together as basket cases all the post-communist Balkan countries, with the exception of Slovenia - this is no longer true. It is cause for guarded optimism. The denizens of the Balkan have always accused the Western media of ignorance, bias and worse. Reports from east Europe are often authored by fly-by-night freelancers with little or no acquaintance with the region. Even The Economist - usually a fount of objective erudition - blundered last week. It made a distinction between "wily" Albanian "rebels" and "moderate" Albanian "nationalists" in the ruling coalition. Alas, these two groups are one and the same: the "wily rebels" simply established a party and joined the government. The European Commission - which maintains bloated and exorbitant missions in all the capitals of the Balkan - should be held to higher standards of reporting, though. Last month it published the second issue of "The West Balkan in Transition". Alas, it is informed not by facts but by the official party line of Brussels: all is well in the Balkan and it is largely thanks to us, the international community. The report's numerical analyses are heavily warped by the curious inclusion of Croatia whose GDP per capita is three times the other countries'. Even with this distorting statistical influence, the regional picture is mixed. Inflation has undoubtedly been tamed - down from 36 percent in 2000 to 6 percent last year. But the trade deficit, up 25 percent on last year, is an ominous $10 billion, or an unsustainable one fifth of the region's combined gross domestic product. About 70 percent of the shortfall is with the European Union and it has grown by a whopping 40 percent in the last 12 months. This gap is the outcome of the EU's protectionist policies. The Balkan's economic mainstays are agriculture, mining and textiles. The EU has erected an elaborate edifice of non-tariff barriers and production and export subsidies that make it inordinately difficult to penetrate its markets and render the prices of its own produce irresistible. This debilitating and destabilizing trade discrimination is, of course, not mentioned anywhere in the report, though it sings the praises of utterly inadequate trade measures unilaterally adopted by the EU in 2000. The sad - and terrifying truth - is that the region survives on private remittances and handouts. The EU has done very little to alleviate this dependence by tackling its structural roots. As assets depreciated in the dilapidated region, foreign direct investment (FDI) - mainly by Greeks, Germans, Slovenes and Austrians - has inevitably picked up, though surprisingly little. At $100 per capita, it is one of the lowest in the world. The region's GDP is still well below 1991. The "growth" recorded since 1999 merely reflects a very gradual recovery from the devastation wrought on the region by the Unites States and its European allies in the Kosovo crisis. This, needless to add, also goes unmentioned. The report's data are sometimes questionable. Consider Macedonia, for instance: its trade deficit last year was $800 million, or 24 percent of GDP - not 11.4 percent, as the report curiously stipulates. Foreign direct investment in 2001 was heavily skewed by the proceeds from the sale of the national telecom, most of which may not qualify as FDI at all. The figures for the inflation and budget deficits in 2002 are, in all probability, wrong. One could do better by simply surfing the Internet. The report relies clubbily on information provided by the IMF - and openly espouses the controversial "Washington Consensus". Thus, it attributes "economic stability" (what is this?) and "price stability" to the use of "external anchors", namely exchange rate pegs. Yet, there is a good reason to believe that rigid, multi-annual pegs have contributed to burgeoning trade deficits, the crumbling of the manufacturing sector, double digit unemployment (one third of the workforce in hapless Macedonia and twice that in Kosovo) and the region's dependence on foreign aid and credits. Macedonia's last devaluation was in 1997. Cumulative inflation since then has amounted to almost 20 percent, rendering the currency overvalued and the terms of trade hopelessly unfavorable. At times, the report reads like outright propaganda. Trade ministers in the region would be astounded to learn that the numerous bilateral free trade agreements they have signed were sponsored by the much derided Stability Pact. The Stabilization and Association process, crow the authors, "considerably improved the political outlook in the region". Tell that to the Macedonians whose country was torn by a vicious civil war in 2001, after it has signed just such a agreement with the EU. To say that donor funding "finances investments and supports reform" is to be unusually economical with the truth. Most of it is sucked by the recipient countries' insatiable balance of payments deficits and gaping budgetary chasms. Donor money encourages inefficiency and corruption, conspicuous consumption and imports. Luckily, international financial institutions, such as the IMF, are increasingly replacing such charity with credits conditioned on structural reforms. The section of the report which deals with "fiscal consolidation" astonishingly ignores the informal sector of the region's economies. With the exception of Croatia, the "gray economy" is thought to equal at least one half the formal part. More than one tenth of the workforce are employed by underground enterprises. International trade, tax revenues, internal investments and even FDI are all affected by the penumbral entrepreneurship of the black economy, comprised of both illicit businesses and tax evading but legitimate ones. It renders fiscal policy less potent than in other European countries. Predictably, the report also fails to note the contradictory nature of Western economic prescriptions. Thus, wage compression in the public sector - touted by the IMF and the World Bank - leads to a decrease in the remuneration of civil servants and, thus, encourages corruption. Yet, the very same multilateral institutions also exhort the countries of the Balkan to battle venality and cronyism. These goals are manifestly incompatible. Contractionary austerity measures and enhanced tax collection reduce the purchasing power of the population and its ability to save and to invest. This is not conducive to the emergence of a private sector. It also hampers counter-cyclical intervention - whether planned or through automatic stabilizers - by the government. This demonetization is further aggravated by restrictive monetary policies, absence of foreign financing and investment and the pervasive dysfunction of all financial intermediaries and monetary transmission mechanisms. The report ignores completely - at least on the regional level - crucial issues such as banking reform, inter-enterprise debt, competition policy, liberalization, deregulation, protection of minority shareholders and foreign investments, openness to foreign trade, research and development outlays, higher education, brain drain, intellectual property rights, or the quality of infrastructure. These matters determine the economic fate of emerging economies far more than their budget deficits. Yet, shockingly, they are nowhere to be found in the 62 pages of "The West Balkan in Transition". It is disappointing that an organization of the caliber of the European Commission is unable to offer anything better than regurgitated formulas and half-baked observations lifted off IMF draft reports. The narrow focus on a few structural reforms and the analysis of a limited set of economic aspects is intellectually lazy and detrimental to a full-bodied comprehension of the region. Little wonder that more than a decade of such "insightful expertise" led to only mass poverty, rampant unemployment and inter-ethnic strife. Bankruptcy and Liquidation It all starts by defaulting on an obligation. Money owed to creditors or to suppliers is not paid on time, interest payments due on bank loans or on corporate bonds issued to the public are withheld. It may be a temporary problem - or a permanent one. As time goes by, the creditors gear up and litigate in a court of law or in a court of arbitration. This leads to a "technical or equity insolvency" status. But this is not the only way a company can be rendered insolvent. It could also run liabilities which outweigh its assets. This is called "bankruptcy insolvency". True, there is a debate raging as to what is the best method to appraise the firm's assets and the liabilities. Should these appraisals be based on market prices - or on book value? There is no one decisive answer. In most cases, there is strong reliance on the figures in the balance sheet. If the negotiations with the creditors of the company (as to how to settle the dispute arising from the company's default) fails, the company itself can file (=ask the court) for bankruptcy in a "voluntary bankruptcy filing". Enter the court. It is only one player (albeit, the most important one) in this unfolding, complex drama. The court does not participate directly in the script. Court officials are appointed. They work hand in hand with the representatives of the creditors (mostly lawyers) and with the management and the owners of the defunct company. They face a tough decision: should they liquidate the company? In other words, should they terminate its business life by (among other acts) selling its assets? The proceeds of the sale of the assets are divided (as "bankruptcy dividend") among the creditors. It makes sense to choose this route only if the (money) value yielded by liquidation exceeds the money the company, as a going concern, as a living, functioning, entity, can generate. The company can, thus, go into "straight bankruptcy". The secured creditors then receive the value of the property which was used to secure their debt (the "collateral", or the "mortgage, lien"). Sometimes, they receive the property itself - if it not easy to liquidate (=sell) it. Once the assets of the company are sold, the first to be fully paid off are the secured creditors. Only then are the priority creditors paid (wholly or partially). The priority creditors include administrative debts, unpaid wages (up to a given limit per worker), uninsured pension claims, taxes, rents, etc. And only if any money left after all these payments is it proportionally doled out to the unsecured creditors. The USA had many versions of bankruptcy laws. There was the 1938 Bankruptcy Act, which was followed by amended versions in 1978, 1984 and, lately, in 1994. Each state has modified the Federal Law to fit its special, local conditions. Still, a few things - the spirit of the law and its philosophy are common to all the versions. Arguably, the most famous procedure is named after the chapter in the law in which it is described, Chapter 11. Following is a brief discussion of chapter 11 intended to demonstrate this spirit and this philosophy. This chapter allows for a mechanism called "reorganization". It must be approved by two thirds of all classes of creditors and then, again, it could be voluntary (initiated by the company) or involuntary (initiated by one to three of its creditors). The American legislator set the following goals in the bankruptcy laws: a. To provide a fair and equitable treatment to the holders of various classes of securities of the firm (shares of different kinds and bonds of different types). b. To eliminate burdensome debt obligations, which obstruct the proper functioning of the firm and hinder its chances to recover and ever repay its debts to its creditors. c. To make sure that the new claims received by the creditors (instead of the old, discredited, ones) equal, at least, what they would have received in liquidation. Examples of such new claims: owners of debentures of the firm can receive, instead, new, long term bonds (known as reorganization bonds, whose interest is payable only from profits). Owners of subordinated debentures will, probably, become shareholders and shareholders in the insolvent firm usually receive no new claims. The chapter dealing with reorganization (the famous "Chapter 11") allows for "arrangements" to be made between debtor and creditors: an extension or reduction of the debts. If the company is traded in a stock exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the USA advises the court as to the best procedure to adopt in case of reorganization. What chapter 11 teaches us is that: American Law leans in favour of maintaining the company as an ongoing concern. A whole is larger than the sum of its parts - and a living business is sometimes worth more than the sum of its assets, sold separately. A more in-depth study of the bankruptcy laws shows that they prescribe three ways to tackle a state of malignant insolvency which threatens the well being and the continued functioning of the firm: Chapter 7 (1978 Act) - Liquidation A District court appoints an "interim trustee" with broad powers. Such a trustee can also be appointed at the request of the creditors and by them. The Interim Trustee is empowered to do the following:
By filing a bond, the debtor (really, the owners of the debtor) is able to regain possession of the business from the trustee. Chapter 11 - Reorganization Unless the court rules otherwise, the debtor remains in possession and in control of the business and the debtor and the creditors are allowed to work together flexibly. They are encouraged to reach a settlement by compromise and agreement rather than by court adjudication. Maybe the biggest legal revolution embedded in chapter 11 is the relaxation of the age old ABSOLUTE PRIORITY rule, that says that the claims of creditors have categorical precedence over ownership claims. Rather, the interests of the creditors have to be balanced with the interests of the owners and even with the larger good of the community and society at large. And so, chapter 11 allows the debtor and creditors to be in direct touch, to negotiate payment schedules, the restructuring of old debts, even the granting of new loans by the same disaffected creditors to the same irresponsible debtor. Chapter 10 Is sort of a legal hybrid, the offspring of chapters 7 and 11: It allows for reorganization under a court appointed independent manager (trustee) who is responsible mainly for the filing of reorganization plans with the court - and for verifying strict adherence to them by both debtor and creditors. Despite its clarity and business orientation, many countries found it difficult to adapt to the pragmatic, non sentimental approach which led to the virtual elimination of the absolute priority rule. In England, for instance, the court appoints an official "receiver" to manage the business and to realize the debtor's assets on behalf of the creditors (and also of the owners). His main task is to maximize the proceeds of the liquidation and he continues to function until a court settlement is decreed (or a creditor settlement is reached, prior to adjudication). When this happens, the receivership ends and the receiver loses his status. The receiver takes possession (but not title) of the assets and the affairs of a business in a receivership. He collects rents and other income on behalf of the firm. So, British Law is much more in favour of the creditors. It recognizes the supremacy of their claims over the property claims of the owners. Honouring obligations - in the eyes of the British legislator and their courts - is the cornerstone of efficient, thriving markets. The courts are entrusted with the protection of this moral pillar of the economy. Economies in transition are in transition not only economically - but also legally. Thus, each one adopted its own version of the bankruptcy laws. In Hungary, Bankruptcy is automatically triggered. Debt for equity swaps are disallowed. Moreover, the law provides for a very short time to reach agreement with creditors about reorganization of the debtor. These features led to 4000 bankruptcies in the wake of the new law - a number which mushroomed to 30,000 by 5/97. In the Czech Republic, the insolvency law comprises special cases (over-indebtedness, for instance). It delineates two rescue programs: a. A debt to equity swap (an alternative to bankruptcy) supervised by the Ministry of Privatization. b. The Consolidation Bank (founded by the State) can buy a firm's obligations, if it went bankrupt, at 60% of par. But the law itself is toothless and lackadaisically applied by the incestuous web of institutions in the country. Between 3/93 - 9/93 there were 1000 filings for insolvency, which resulted in only 30 commenced bankruptcy procedures. There hasn't been a single major bankruptcy in the Czech Republic since then - and not for lack of candidates. Poland is a special case. The pre-war (1934) law declares bankruptcy in a state of lasting illiquidity and excessive indebtedness. Each creditor can apply to declare a company bankrupt. An insolvent company is obliged to file a maximum of 2 weeks following cessation of debt payments. There is a separate liquidation law which allows for voluntary procedures. Bad debts are transferred to base portfolios and have one of three fates:
No one is certain what is the best model. The reason is that no one knows the answers to the questions: are the rights of the creditors superior to the rights of the owners? Is it better to rehabilitate than to liquidate? Until such time as these questions are answered and as long as the corporate debt crisis deepens -we will witness a flowering of versions of bankruptcy laws all over the world. It is when the going gets better, that the going gets tough. This enigmatic sentence bears explanation: when a firm is in dire straits, in the throes of a crisis, or is a loss maker conflicts between the shareholders (partners) are rare. When a company is in the start-up phase, conducting research and development and fighting for its continued, profitable survival in the midst of a massive investment cycle rarely will internal strife arise and threaten its existence. It is when the company turns a profit, when there is cash in the till that, typically, all manner of grievances, complaints and demands arise. The internecine conflicts are especially acute where the ownership is divided equally. It is more accentuated when one of the partners feels that he is contributing more to the business, either because of his unique talents or because of his professional experience, contacts or due to the size of his initial investments (and the other partner does not share his views). The typical grievances relate to the equitable, proportional, division of the company's income between the partners. In many firms partners serve in various management functions and draw a salary plus expenses. This is considered by other partners to be a dividend drawn in disguise. They want to draw the same amounts from the company's coffers (or to maintain some kind of symbolic monetary difference in favour of the position holder). Most minority partners are afraid of a tyranny of the majority and of the company being robbed blind (legally and less legally) by the partners in management positions. Others are plainly jealous, poisoned by rumours and bad advisors, pressurized by a spouse. A myriad of reasons can lead to internal strife, detrimental to the future of the operation. This leads to a paralysis of the work of the company. Management and ownership resources are dedicated to taking sides in the raging battle and to thinking up new strategies and tactics of attacking "the enemy". Indeed, animosity, even enmity, arise together with bitterness and air of paranoia and impending implosion. The business itself is neglected, then derailed. Directors argue for hours regarding their perks and benefits and deal with the main issues in a matter of a few minutes. The company car gets more attention than the company's main clients, the expense accounts are more closely scrutinized than the marketing strategies of the firm's competitors. This is disastrous and before long the company begins to lose clients, its marketing position degenerates, its performance and customer satisfaction deteriorate. This is mortal danger and it should be nipped in the bud. Frankly, I do not believe much in introducing rational solutions to this highly charged EMOTIVE-PSYCHOLOGICAL problem. Logic cannot eliminate envy, ratio cannot cope with jealousy and bad mouthing will not stop if certain visible disparities are addressed. Still, dealing with the situation openly is better than relegating it to obscurity. We must, first, make a distinction between a division of the company's assets and liabilities upon a dissolution of the partnership for whatever reason and the distribution of its on-going revenues or profits. In the first case (dissolution), the best solution I know of, is practised by the Bedouins in the Sinai Peninsula. For simplification's sake, let us discuss a collaboration between two equal partners that is coming to its end. One of the partners is then charged with dividing the partnership's assets and liabilities into two lots (that he deems equal). The other partner is then given the right of being the FIRST to choose one of the lots to himself. This is an ingenious scheme: the partner in charge of allocating the lots will do his utmost to ensure that they are indeed identical. Each lot will, probably, contain values of assets and liabilities identical to the other lot. This is because the partner in charge of the division does not know WHICH lot the other partner will choose. If he divides the lots unevenly he runs the risk of his partner choosing the better lot and leaving him with the lesser one. Life is not that simple when it comes to dividing a stream of income or of profits. Income can be distributed to the shareholders in many ways: wages, perks and benefits, expense accounts, and dividends. It is difficult to disentangle what money is paid to a shareholder against a real contribution and what money is a camouflaged dividend. Moreover, shareholders are supposed to contribute to their firm (this is why they own shares) so why should they be especially compensated when they do so? The latter question is particularly acute when the shareholder is not a full time employee of the firm but allocates only a portion of his time and resources to it. Solutions do exist, however. One category of solutions involves coming up with a clear definition of the functions of a shareholder (a job description). This is a prerequisite. Without such clarity, it would be close to impossible to quantify the respective contributions of the shareholders. Following this detailed analysis, a pecuniary assessment of the contribution should be made. This is a tricky part. How to value the importance to the company of this or that shareholder? One way is to publish a public tender for the shareholder's job, based on the aforementioned job description. The shareholder will accept, in advance, to match the lowest bid in the tender. Example: if the shareholder is the Active Chairman of the Board, his job will be minutely described in writing. Then, a tender will be published by the company for the job, including a job description. A committee, whose odd number of members will be appointed by the Board of Directors, will select the winner whose bid (cost) was the lowest. The shareholder will match these low end terms. In other words: the shareholder will accept the market's verdict. To perfect this technique, the CURRENT functionaries should also submit their bids under assumed names. This way, not only the issue of their compensation will be determined but also the more basic question of whether they are the fittest for the job. Another way is to consult executive search agencies and personnel placement agencies (also known as "Headhunters"). Such organizations can save the prolonged hassle of a public tender, on the one hand. On the other hand, their figures are likely to be skewed up. Because they are getting a commission equal to one monthly wage of the successfully placed executive they will tend to quote a level of compensation higher than the market's. An approach should, therefore, be made to at least three such agencies and the resulting average figure should be adjusted down by 10% (approximately the commission payable to these agencies). A closely similar method is to follow what other, comparable, firms, are offering their position-holders. This can be done by studying the classified ads and by directly asking the companies (if such direct enquiry is at all possible). Yet another approach is to appoint a management consultancy to do the job: are the shareholders the best positioned people in their respective functions? Is their compensation realistic? Should alternative management methods be implemented (rotation, co-management, management by committee)? All the above mentioned are FORMAL techniques in which arbitration is carried out to determine the remuneration level befitting the shareholder's position. Any compensation that he receives above this level is evidently a hidden dividend. The arbitration can be carried out directly by the market or by select specialists. There are, however, more direct approaches. Some solutions are performance related. A base compensation (salary) is agreed between the parties: each shareholder, regardless of his position, dedication to the job, or contribution to the firm will take home an amount of monthly fee reflecting his shareholding proportion or an amount equal to the one received by other shareholders. This, really, is the hidden dividend, disguised as a salary. The remaining part of the compensation package will be proportional to some performance criteria. Let us take the simplest case: two equal partners. One is in charge of activity A, which yields to the company AA in income and AAA in profits (gross or net). The second partner supervises and manages activity B, which yields to the company BB in revenues and BBB in profits. Both will receive an equal "base salary". Then, an additional total amount available to both partners will be decided ("incentive base"). The first partner will receive an additional amount, which will be one of the ratios {AA/(AA+BB)} or {AAA/(AAA+BBB)} multiplied by the incentive base. The second partner will receive an additional amount, which will be one of the ratios {BB/(AA+BB)} or {BBB/(AAA+BBB)} multiplied by the same incentive base. A recalculation of the compensation packages will be done quarterly to reflect changes in revenues and in profits. In case the activity yields losses it is better to use the revenues for calculation purposes. The profits should be used only when the firm is divided to clear profit and loss centres, which could be completely disentangled from each other. All the above methods deal with partners whose contributions are NOT equal (one is more experienced, the other has more contacts, or a formal technological education, etc.). These solutions are also applicable when the partners DISAGREE concerning the valuation of their respective contributions. When the partners agree that they contribute equally, some basis can be agreed for calculating a fair compensation. For instance: the number of hours dedicated to the business, or even some arbitrary coefficient. But whatever the method employed, when there is no such agreement between the partners, they should recognize each other's skills, talents and specific contributions. The compensation packages should never exceed what the shareholders can reasonably expect to get by way of dividends. Even the most envious person, if he knows that his partner can bring him in dividends more than he can ever hope for in compensation will succumb to greed and award his partner what he needs in order to produce those dividends. Banks, Financial Statements of Banks are institutions where miracles happen regularly. We rarely entrust our money to anyone but ourselves and our banks. Despite a very chequered history of mismanagement, corruption, false promises and representations, delusions and behavioural inconsistency banks still succeed to motivate us to give them our money. Partly it is the feeling that there is safety in numbers. The fashionable term today is "moral hazard". The implicit guarantees of the state and of other financial institutions move us to take risks which we would, otherwise, have avoided. Partly it is the sophistication of the banks in marketing and promoting themselves and their products. Glossy brochures, professional computer and video presentations and vast, shrine-like, real estate complexes all serve to enhance the image of the banks as the temples of the new religion of money. But what is behind all this? How can we judge the soundness of our banks? In other words, how can we tell if our money is safely tucked away in a safe haven? The reflex is to go to the bank's balance sheets. Banks and balance sheets have been both invented in their modern form in the 15th century. A balance sheet, coupled with other financial statements is supposed to provide us with a true and full picture of the health of the bank, its past and its long-term prospects. The surprising thing is that despite common opinion it does. But it is rather useless unless you know how to read it. Financial statements (Income or Profit and Loss - Statement, Cash Flow Statement and Balance Sheet) come in many forms. Sometimes they conform to Western accounting standards (the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, GAAP, or the less rigorous and more fuzzily worded International Accounting Standards, IAS). Otherwise, they conform to local accounting standards, which often leave a lot to be desired. Still, you should look for banks, which make their updated financial reports available to you. The best choice would be a bank that is audited by one of the Big Four Western accounting firms and makes its audit reports publicly available. Such audited financial statements should consolidate the financial results of the bank with the financial results of its subsidiaries or associated companies. A lot often hides in those corners of corporate holdings. Banks are rated by independent agencies. The most famous and most reliable of the lot is Fitch Ratings. Another one is Moodys. These agencies assign letter and number combinations to the banks that reflect their stability. Most agencies differentiate the short term from the long term prospects of the banking institution rated. Some of them even study (and rate) issues, such as the legality of the operations of the bank (legal rating). Ostensibly, all a concerned person has to do, therefore, is to step up to the bank manager, muster courage and ask for the bank's rating. Unfortunately, life is more complicated than rating agencies would have us believe. They base themselves mostly on the financial results of the bank rated as a reliable gauge of its financial strength or financial profile. Nothing is further from the truth. Admittedly, the financial results do contain a few important facts. But one has to look beyond the naked figures to get the real often much less encouraging picture. Consider the thorny issue of exchange rates. Financial statements are calculated (sometimes stated in USD in addition to the local currency) using the exchange rate prevailing on the 31st of December of the fiscal year (to which the statements refer). In a country with a volatile domestic currency this would tend to completely distort the true picture. This is especially true if a big chunk of the activity preceded this arbitrary date. The same applies to financial statements, which were not inflation-adjusted in high inflation countries. The statements will look inflated and even reflect profits where heavy losses were incurred. "Average amounts" accounting (which makes use of average exchange rates throughout the year) is even more misleading. The only way to truly reflect reality is if the bank were to keep two sets of accounts: one in the local currency and one in USD (or in some other currency of reference). Otherwise, fictitious growth in the asset base (due to inflation or currency fluctuations) could result. Another example: in many countries, changes in regulations can greatly effect the financial statements of a bank. In 1996, in Russia, for example, the Bank of Russia changed the algorithm for calculating an important banking ratio (the capital to risk weighted assets ratio). Unless a Russian bank restated its previous financial statements accordingly, a sharp change in profitability appeared from nowhere. The net assets themselves are always misstated: the figure refers to the situation on 31/12. A 48-hour loan given to a collaborating client can inflate the asset base on the crucial date. This misrepresentation is only mildly ameliorated by the introduction of an "average assets" calculus. Moreover, some of the assets can be interest earning and performing others, non-performing. The maturity distribution of the assets is also of prime importance. If most of the bank's assets can be withdrawn by its clients on a very short notice (on demand) it can swiftly find itself in trouble with a run on its assets leading to insolvency. Another oft-used figure is the net income of the bank. It is important to distinguish interest income from non-interest income. In an open, sophisticated credit market, the income from interest differentials should be minimal and reflect the risk plus a reasonable component of income to the bank. But in many countries (Japan, Russia) the government subsidizes banks by lending to them money cheaply (through the Central Bank or through bonds). The banks then proceed to lend the cheap funds at exorbitant rates to their customers, thus reaping enormous interest income. In many countries the income from government securities is tax free, which represents another form of subsidy. A high income from interest is a sign of weakness, not of health, here today, gone tomorrow. The preferred indicator should be income from operations (fees, commissions and other charges). There are a few key ratios to observe. A relevant question is whether the bank is accredited with international banking agencies. These issue regulatory capital requirements and other mandatory ratios. Compliance with these demands is a minimum in the absence of which, the bank should be regarded as positively dangerous. The return on the bank's equity (ROE) is the net income divided by its average equity. The return on the bank's assets (ROA) is its net income divided by its average assets. The (tier 1 or total) capital divided by the bank's risk weighted assets a measure of the bank's capital adequacy. Most banks follow the provisions of the Basel Accord as set by the Basel Committee of Bank Supervision (also known as the G10). This could be misleading because the Accord is ill equipped to deal with risks associated with emerging markets, where default rates of 33% and more are the norm. Finally, there is the common stock to total assets ratio. But ratios are not cure-alls. Inasmuch as the quantities that comprise them can be toyed with they can be subject to manipulation and distortion. It is true that it is better to have high ratios than low ones. High ratios are indicative of a bank's underlying strength, reserves, and provisions and, therefore, of its ability to expand its business. A strong bank can also participate in various programs, offerings and auctions of the Central Bank or of the Ministry of Finance. The larger the share of the bank's earnings that is retained in the bank and not distributed as profits to its shareholders the better these ratios and the bank's resilience to credit risks. Still, these ratios should be taken with more than a grain of salt. Not even the bank's profit margin (the ratio of net income to total income) or its asset utilization coefficient (the ratio of income to average assets) should be relied upon. They could be the result of hidden subsidies by the government and management misjudgement or understatement of credit risks. To elaborate on the last two points: A bank can borrow cheap money from the Central Bank (or pay low interest to its depositors and savers) and invest it in secure government bonds, earning a much higher interest income from the bonds' coupon payments. The end result: a rise in the bank's income and profitability due to a non-productive, non-lasting arbitrage operation. Otherwise, the bank's management can understate the amounts of bad loans carried on the bank's books, thus decreasing the necessary set-asides and increasing profitability. The financial statements of banks largely reflect the management's appraisal of the business. This has proven to be a poor guide. In the main financial results page of a bank's books, special attention should be paid to provisions for the devaluation of securities and to the unrealized difference in the currency position. This is especially true if the bank is holding a major part of the assets (in the form of financial investments or of loans) and the equity is invested in securities or in foreign exchange denominated instruments. Separately, a bank can be trading for its own position (the Nostro), either as a market maker or as a trader. The profit (or loss) on securities trading has to be discounted because it is conjectural and incidental to the bank's main activities: deposit taking and loan making. Most banks deposit some of their assets with other banks. This is normally considered to be a way of spreading the risk. But in highly volatile economies with sickly, underdeveloped financial sectors, all the institutions in the sector are likely to move in tandem (a highly correlated market). Cross deposits among banks only serve to increase the risk of the depositing bank (as the recent affair with Toko Bank in Russia and the banking crisis in South Korea have demonstrated). Further closer to the bottom line are the bank's operating expenses: salaries, depreciation, fixed or capital assets (real estate and equipment) and administrative expenses. The rule of thumb is: the higher these expenses, the weaker the bank. The great historian Toynbee once said that great civilizations collapse immediately after they bequeath to us the most impressive buildings. This is doubly true with banks. If you see a bank fervently engaged in the construction of palatial branches stay away from it. Banks are risk arbitrageurs. They live off the mismatch between assets and liabilities. To the best of their ability, they try to second guess the markets and reduce such a mismatch by assuming part of the risks and by engaging in portfolio management. For this they charge fees and commissions, interest and profits which constitute their sources of income. If any expertise is imputed to the banking system, it is risk management. Banks are supposed to adequately assess, control and minimize credit risks. They are required to implement credit rating mechanisms (credit analysis and value at risk VAR - models), efficient and exclusive information-gathering systems, and to put in place the right lending policies and procedures. Just in case they misread the market risks and these turned into credit risks (which happens only too often), banks are supposed to put aside amounts of money which could realistically offset loans gone sour or future non-performing assets. These are the loan loss reserves and provisions. Loans are supposed to be constantly monitored, reclassified and charges made against them as applicable. If you see a bank with zero reclassifications, charge offs and recoveries either the bank is lying through its teeth, or it is not taking the business of banking too seriously, or its management is no less than divine in its prescience. What is important to look at is the rate of provision for loan losses as a percentage of the loans outstanding. Then it should be compared to the percentage of non-performing loans out of the loans outstanding. If the two figures are out of kilter, either someone is pulling your leg or the management is incompetent or lying to you. The first thing new owners of a bank do is, usually, improve the placed asset quality (a polite way of saying that they get rid of bad, non-performing loans, whether declared as such or not). They do this by classifying the loans. Most central banks in the world have in place regulations for loan classification and if acted upon, these yield rather more reliable results than any management's "appraisal", no matter how well intentioned. In some countries the Central Bank (or the Supervision of the Banks) forces banks to set aside provisions against loans at the highest risk categories, even if they are performing. This, by far, should be the preferable method. Of the two sides of the balance sheet, the assets side is the more critical. Within it, the interest earning assets deserve the greatest attention. What percentage of the loans is commercial and what percentage given to individuals? How many borrowers are there (risk diversification is inversely proportional to exposure to single or large borrowers)? How many of the transactions are with "related parties"? How much is in local currency and how much in foreign currencies (and in which)? A large exposure to foreign currency lending is not necessarily healthy. A sharp, unexpected devaluation could move a lot of the borrowers into non-performance and default and, thus, adversely affect the quality of the asset base. In which financial vehicles and instruments is the bank invested? How risky are they? And so on. No less important is the maturity structure of the assets. It is an integral part of the liquidity (risk) management of the bank. The crucial question is: what are the cash flows projected from the maturity dates of the different assets and liabilities and how likely are they to materialize. A rough matching has to exist between the various maturities of the assets and the liabilities. The cash flows generated by the assets of the bank must be used to finance the cash flows resulting from the banks' liabilities. A distinction has to be made between stable and hot funds (the latter in constant pursuit of higher yields). Liquidity indicators and alerts have to be set in place and calculated a few times daily. Gaps (especially in the short term category) between the bank's assets and its liabilities are a very worrisome sign. But the bank's macroeconomic environment is as important to the determination of its financial health and of its creditworthiness as any ratio or micro-analysis. The state of the financial markets sometimes has a larger bearing on the bank's soundness than other factors. A fine example is the effect that interest rates or a devaluation have on a bank's profitability and capitalization. The implied (not to mention the explicit) support of the authorities, of other banks and of investors (domestic as well as international) sets the psychological background to any future developments. This is only too logical. In an unstable financial environment, knock-on effects are more likely. Banks deposit money with other banks on a security basis. Still, the value of securities and collaterals is as good as their liquidity and as the market itself. The very ability to do business (for instance, in the syndicated loan market) is influenced by the larger picture. Falling equity markets herald trading losses and loss of income from trading operations and so on. Perhaps the single most important factor is the general level of interest rates in the economy. It determines the present value of foreign exchange and local currency denominated government debt. It influences the balance between realized and unrealized losses on longer-term (commercial or other) paper. One of the most important liquidity generation instruments is the repurchase agreement (repo). Banks sell their portfolios of government debt with an obligation to buy it back at a later date. If interest rates shoot up the losses on these repos can trigger margin calls (demands to immediately pay the losses or else materialize them by buying the securities back). Margin calls are a drain on liquidity. Thus, in an environment of rising interest rates, repos could absorb liquidity from the banks, deflate rather than inflate. The same principle applies to leverage investment vehicles used by the bank to improve the returns of its securities trading operations. High interest rates here can have an even more painful outcome. As liquidity is crunched, the banks are forced to materialize their trading losses. This is bound to put added pressure on the prices of financial assets, trigger more margin calls and squeeze liquidity further. It is a vicious circle of a monstrous momentum once commenced. But high interest rates, as we mentioned, also strain the asset side of the balance sheet by applying pressure to borrowers. The same goes for a devaluation. Liabilities connected to foreign exchange grow with a devaluation with no (immediate) corresponding increase in local prices to compensate the borrower. Market risk is thus rapidly transformed to credit risk. Borrowers default on their obligations. Loan loss provisions need to be increased, eating into the bank's liquidity (and profitability) even further. Banks are then tempted to play with their reserve coverage levels in order to increase their reported profits and this, in turn, raises a real concern regarding the adequacy of the levels of loan loss reserves. Only an increase in the equity base can then assuage the (justified) fears of the market but such an increase can come only through foreign investment, in most cases. And foreign investment is usually a last resort, pariah, solution (see Southeast Asia and the Czech Republic for fresh examples in an endless supply of them. Japan and China are, probably, next). In the past, the thinking was that some of the risk could be ameliorated by hedging in forward markets (=by selling it to willing risk buyers). But a hedge is only as good as the counterparty that provides it and in a market besieged by knock-on insolvencies, the comfort is dubious. In most emerging markets, for instance, there are no natural sellers of foreign exchange (companies prefer to hoard the stuff). So forwards are considered to be a variety of gambling with a default in case of substantial losses a very plausible way out. Banks depend on lending for their survival. The lending base, in turn, depends on the quality of lending opportunities. In high-risk markets, this depends on the possibility of connected lending and on the quality of the collaterals offered by the borrowers. Whether the borrowers have qualitative collaterals to offer is a direct outcome of the liquidity of the market and on how they use the proceeds of the lending. These two elements are intimately linked with the banking system. Hence the penultimate vicious circle: where no functioning and professional banking system exists no good borrowers will emerge. Banks, German Denial is a ubiquitous psychological defense mechanism. It involves the repression of bad news, unpleasant information, and anxiety-inducing experiences. Judging by the German press, the country is in a state of denial regarding the waning health of its economy and the dwindling fortunes of its financial system. Commerzbank, Germany's fourth largest lender, saw its shares decimated by more than 80 percent to a 19-year low, having increased its loan-loss provisions to cover flood-submerged east German debts. Faced with a precipitous drop in net profit, it reacted reflexively by sacking yet more staff. The shares of many other German banks trade below book value. Dresdner Bank - Germany's third largest private establishment - already trimmed an unprecedented one fifth of its workforce this year alone. Other leading German banks - such as Deutsche Bank and Hypovereinsbank - resorted to panic selling of equity portfolios, real-estate, non-core activities, and securitized assets to patch up their ailing income statements. Deutsche Bank, for instance, unloaded its US leasing and custody businesses. On September 19, Moody's changed its outlook for Germany's largest banks from "stable" to "negative". In a scathing remark, it said: "The rating agency stated several times already that current difficult economic conditions that are hurting the banking business in Germany come on top of the legacy of past strategies that were less focused on strengthening the banks' recurring earning power. Indeed, the German private-sector banks, as a group, remain among the lowest-performing large European banks." Last week, Fitch Ratings, the international agency, followed suit and downgraded the long-term , short- term, and individual ratings of Dresdner Bank and of Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank (HVB). These were only the last in a series of negative outlooks pertaining to German insurers and banks. It is ironic that Fitch cited the "bear equity markets (that) have taken their toll not only on trading results but also on sales to private customers, the fund management business and on corporate finance." Germans used to be immune to the stock exchange and its lures until they were caught in the frenzied global equities bubble. Moody's observes wryly that "a material and stable retail franchise in its home market, even if more modestly profitable, can and does represent a reliable line of defence against temporary difficulties in financial and wholesale markets." The technology-laden and scandal-ridden Neuer Markt - Europe's answer to America's NASDAQ - as well as the SMAX exchange for small-caps were shut down last week, the former having lost a staggering 96 percent of its value since March 2000. This compared to Britain's AIM, which lost "only" half its worth. Even Britain's infamous FTSE-TechMARK faded by a "mere" 88 percent. Only 1 company floated on the Neuer Markt this year - compared to more than 130 two years ago. In an unprecedented show of "no-confidence", more than 40 companies withdrew their listings last year. The Duetsche Boerse promised to create two new classes of shares on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. It belatedly vowed to introduce more transparency and openness to foreign investors. Banks have been accused by irate customers of helping to list inappropriate firms and providing fraudulent advisory services. Court cases are pending against the likes of Commerzbank. These proceedings may dash the bank's hopes to move from retail into private banking. To further compound matters, Germany is in the throes of a tsunami of corporate insolvencies. This long-overdue restructuring, though beneficial in the long run, couldn't have transpired at a worse time, as far as the banks go. Massive provisions and write-downs have voraciously consumed their capital base even as operating profits have plummeted. This double whammy more than eroded the benefits of their painful cost-cutting measures. German banks - not unlike Japanese ones - maintain incestuous relationships with their clients. When it finally collapsed in April, Philip Holzmann AG owed billions to Deutsche Bank with whom it had a cordial working relationship for more than a century. But the bank also owned 19.6 percent of the ailing construction behemoth and chaired its supervisory board - the relics of previous shambolic rescue packages. Germany competes with Austria in over-branching, with Japan in souring assets, and with Russia in overhead. According to the German daily, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the cost to income ratio of German banks is 90 percent. Mass bankruptcies and consolidation - voluntary or enforced - are unavoidable, especially in the cooperative, mortgage, and savings banks sectors, concludes the paper. The process is a decade-old. More than 1500 banks vanished from the German landscape in this period. Another 2500 remain making Germany still one of the most over-banked countries in the world. Moody's don't put much stock in the cost-cutting measures of the German banks. Added competition and a "more realistic pricing" of loans and services are far more important to their shriveling bottom line. But "that light is not yet visible at the end of the tunnel ... and challenging market conditions are likely to persist for the time being." The woeful state of Germany's financial system reflects not only Germany's economic malaise - "The Economist" called it the "sick man" of Europe - but its failed attempt to imitate and emulate the inimitable financial centers of London and New-York. It is a rebuke to the misguided belief that capitalistic models - and institutions - can be transplanted in their entirety across cultural barriers. It is incontrovertible proof that history - and the core competencies it spawns - still matter. When German insurers and banks, for instance, branched into faddish businesses - such as the Internet and mobile telephony - they did so in vacuum. Germany has few venture capitalists and American-style entrepreneurs. This misguided strategy resulted in a frightening erosion of the strength and capital base of the intrepid investors. In a sense, Germany - and definitely its eastern Lander - is a country in transition. Risk-aversion is giving way to risk-seeking in the forms of investments in equities and derivatives and venture capital. Family ownership is gradually supplanted by stock exchange listings, imported management, and mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers - both friendly and hostile. The social contracts regarding employment, pensions, the role of the trade unions, the balance between human and pecuniary capital, and the carving up of monopoly market niches - are being re-written. Global integration means that, as sovereignty is transferred to supranational entities, the cozy relationship between the banks and the German government on all levels is over. Last October, Hans Eichel, the German finance minister, announced OECD-inspired anti-money laundering measures that are likely to compromise bank secrecy and client anonymity and, thus, hurt the German - sometimes murky - banking business. Erstwhile rampant government intervention is now mitigated or outright prohibited by the European Union. Thus, German Laender are forced, by the European Commission, to partly abolish, three years hence, their guarantees to the Landesbanken (regional development banks) and Sparkassen (thrifts). German diversification to Austria and central and east Europe will provide only temporary respite. As the EU enlarges and digests, at the very least, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 2004-5 - German franchises there will come under the uncompromising remit of the Commission once more. In general, Germans fared worse than Austrians in their extraterritorial banking ventures. Less cosmopolitan, with less exposure to the parts of the former Habsburg Empire, and struggling with a stagnant domestic economy - German banks found it difficult to turn central European banks around as successfully as the likes of the Austrian Erste Bank did. They did make inroads into niche structured financing markets in north Europe and the USA - but these seem to be random excursions rather a studied shift of business emphasis. On the bright side, Moody's - though it maintains a negative outlook on German banking - noted, in November 2001, the banks' "intrinsic financial strength and diversified operating base". Tax reform and the hesitant introduction of private pensions are also cause for restrained optimism. Pursuant to the purchase of Drsedner Bank by Allianz, Moody's welcome the emergence of bancassurance and Allfinanz models - financial services one stop shops. German banks are also positioned to reap the benefits of their considerable investments in e-commerce, technology, and the restructuring of their branch networks. The Depression on 1929-1936 may have started with the meltdown of capital markets, especially that of Wall Street - but it was exacerbated by the collapse of the concatenated international banking system. The world today is even more integrated. The collapse of one or more major German banks can result in dire consequences and not only in the euro zone. The IMF says as much in its "World Economic Outlook" published on September 25. The Germans deny this prognosis - and the diagnosis - vehemently. Bundesbank President Ernst Welteke - a board member of the European Central Bank - spent the better part of last week implausibly denying any crisis in German banking. These are mere "structural problems in the weak phase", he told a press conference. Nothing consolidation can't solve. It is this consistent refusal to confront reality that is the most worrisome. In the short to medium term, German banks are likely to outlive the storm. In the process, they will lose their iron grip on the domestic market as customer loyalty dissipates and foreign competition increases. If they do not confront their plight with honesty and open-mindedness, they may well be reduced to glorified back-office extensions of the global giants. Banks, Stability of Banks are the most unsafe institutions in the world. Worldwide, hundreds of them crash every few years. Two decades ago, the US Government was forced to invest hundreds of billions of Dollars in the Savings and Loans industry. Multi-billion dollar embezzlement schemes were unearthed in the much feted BCCI - wiping both equity capital and deposits. Barings bank - having weathered 330 years of tumultuous European history - succumbed to a bout of untrammeled speculation by a rogue trader. In 1890 it faced the very same predicament only to be salvaged by other British banks, including the Bank of England. The list is interminable. There were more than 30 major banking crises this century alone. That banks are very risky - is proven by the inordinate number of regulatory institutions which supervise banks and their activities. The USA sports a few organizations which insure depositors against the seemingly inevitable vicissitudes of the banking system. The FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporations) insures against the loss of every deposit of less than 100,000 USD. The HLSIC insures depositors in saving houses in a similar manner. Other regulatory agencies supervise banks, audit them, or regulate them. It seems that you cannot be too cautious where banks are concerned. The word "BANK" is derived from the old Italian word "BANCA" - bench or counter. Italian bankers used to conduct their business on benches. Nothing much changed ever since - maybe with the exception of the scenery. Banks hide their fragility and vulnerability - or worse - behinds marble walls. The American President, Andrew Jackson, was so set against banks - that he dismantled the nascent central bank - the Second Bank of the United States. A series of bank scandals is sweeping through much of the developing world - Eastern and Central Europe to the fore. "Alfa S.", "Makedonija Reklam" and TAT have become notorious household names. What is wrong with the banking systems in Central Eastern Europe (CEE) in general - and in Macedonia in particular? In a nutshell, almost everything. It is mainly a crisis of trust and adverse psychology. Financial experts know that Markets work on expectations and evaluations, fear and greed. The fuel of the financial markets is emotional - not rational. Banks operate through credit multipliers. When Depositor A places 100,000 USD with Bank A, the Bank puts aside about 20% of the money. This is labelled a reserve and is intended to serve as an insurance policy cum a liquidity cushion. The implicit assumption is that no more than 20% of the total number of depositors will claim their money at any given moment. In times of panic, when ALL the depositors want their money back - the bank is rendered illiquid having locked away in its reserves only 20% of the funds. Commercial banks hold their reserves with the Central Bank or with a third party institution, explicitly and exclusively set up for this purpose. What does the bank do with the other 80% of Depositor A's money ($80,000)? It lends it to Borrower B. The Borrower pays Bank A interest on the loan. The difference between the interest that Bank A pays to Depositor A on his deposit - and the interest that he charges Borrower B - is the bank's income from these operations. In the meantime, Borrower B deposits the money that he received from Bank A (as a loan) in his own bank, Bank B. Bank B puts aside, as a reserve, 20% of this money - and lends 80% (=$64,000) to Borrower C, who promptly deposits it in Bank C. At this stage, Depositor A's money ($100,000) has multiplied and become $244,000. Depositor A has $100,000 in his account with Bank A, Borrower B has $80,000 in his account in Bank B, and Borrower C has $64,000 in his account in Bank C. This process is called credit multiplication. The Western Credit multiplier is 9. This means that every $100,000 deposited with Bank A could, theoretically, become $900,000: $400,000 in credits and $500,000 in deposits. For every $900,000 in the banks' books - there are only 100,000 in physical dollars. Banks are the most heavily leveraged businesses in the world. But this is only part of the problem. Another part is that the profit margins of banks are limited. The hemorrhaging consumers of bank services would probably beg to differ - but banking profits are mostly optical illusions. We can safely say that banks are losing money throughout most of their existence. The SPREAD is the difference between interest paid to depositors and interest collected on credits. The spread in Macedonia is 8 to 10%. This spread is supposed to cover all the bank's expenses and leave its shareholders with a profit. But this is a shakey proposition. To understand why, we have to analyse the very concept of interest rates. Virtually every major religion forbids the charging of interest on credits and loans. To charge interest is considered to be part usury and part blackmail. People who lent money and charged interest for it were ill-regarded - remember Shakespeare's "The Merchant of Venice"? Originally, interest was charged on money lent was meant to compensate for the risks associated with the provision of credit in a specific market. There were four such hazards: First, there are the operational costs of money lending itself. Money lenders are engaged in arbitrage and the brokering of funds. In other words, they borrow the money that they then lend on. There are costs of transportation and communications as well as business overhead. The second risk is that of inflation. It erodes the value of money used to repay credits. In quotidian terms: as time passes, the Lender can buy progressively less with the money repaid by the Borrower. The purchasing power of the money diminishes. The measure of this erosion is called inflation. And there is a risk of scarcity. Money is a rare and valued object. Once lent it is out of the Lender's hands, exchanged for mere promises and oft-illiquid collateral. If, for instance, a Bank lends money at a fixed interest rate - it gives up the opportunity to lend it anew, at higher rates. The last - and most obvious risk is default: when the Borrower cannot or would not pay back the credit that he has taken. All these risks have to be offset by the bank's relatively minor profit margin. Hence the bank's much decried propensity to pay their depositors as symbolically as they can - and charge their borrowers the highest interest rates they can get away with. But banks face a few problems in adopting this seemingly straightforward business strategy. Interest rates are an instrument of monetary policy. As such, they are centrally dictated. They are used to control the money supply and the monetary aggregates and through them to fine tune economic activity. Governors of Central Banks (where central banks are autonomous) and Ministers of Finance (where central banks are more subservient) raise interest rates in order to contain economic activity and its inflationary effects. They cut interest rates to prevent an economic slowdown and to facilitate the soft landing of a booming economy. Despite the fact that banks (and credit card companies, which are really banks) print their own money (remember the multiplier) - they do not control the money supply or the interest rates that they charge their clients. This creates paradoxes. The higher the interest rates - the higher the costs of financing payable by businesses and households. They, in turn, increase the prices of their products and services to reflect the new cost of money. We can say that, to some extent, rather than prevent it, higher interest rates contribute to inflation - i.e., to the readjustment of the general price level. Also, the higher the interest rates, the more money earned by the banks. They lend this extra money to Borrowers and multiply it through the credit multiplier. High interest rates encourage inflation from another angle altogether: They sustain an unrealistic exchange rate between the domestic and foreign currencies. People would rather hold the currency which yields higher interest (=the domestic one). They buy it and sell all other currencies. Conversions of foreign exchange into local currency are net contributors to inflation. On the other hand, a high exchange rate also increases the prices of imported products. Still, all in all, higher interest rates contribute to the very inflation that are intended to suppress. Another interesting phenomenon: High interest rates are supposed to ameliorate the effects of soaring default rates. In a country like Macedonia - where the payments morale is low and default rates are stratospheric - the banks charge incredibly high interest rates to compensate for this specific risk. But high interest rates make it difficult to repay one's loans and may tip certain obligations from performing to non-performing. Even debtors who pay small amounts of interest in a timely fashion - often find it impossible to defray larger interest charges. Thus, high interest rates increase the risk of default rather than reduce it. Not only are interest rates a blunt and inefficient instrument - but they are also not set by the banks, nor do they reflect the micro-economic realities with which they are forced to cope. Should interest rates be determined by each bank separately (perhaps according to the composition and risk profile of its portfolio)? Should banks have the authority to print money notes (as they did throughout the 18th and 19th centuries)? The advent of virtual cash and electronic banking may bring about these outcomes even without the complicity of the state. Belarus, Economy of Most of the post-communist countries in transition are ruled either by reformed communists or by authoritarian anti-communists. It is ironic that the West - recently led more by the European Union than by the USA - helps the former to get elected even as it demonizes and vilifies the latter. The "regime change" fad, one must recall, started in the Balkan with Slobodan Milosevic, not in Afghanistan, or Iraq. Aleksander Kwasniewski, a former communist minister and the current president of Poland is feted by the likes of George Bush. Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer and Russia's president, is a strategic ally of the USA. Branko Crvnkovski - an active "socialist" and the new prime minister of Macedonia - is the darling of the international community. Vaclav Klaus (former prime minister of the Czech Republic), Vladimir Meciar (former strongman and prime minister of Slovakia), Ljubco Georgievski (until recently the outspoken prime minister of Macedonia), Viktor Orban (voted out as prime minister of Hungary earlier this year) - all strident anti-communists - are shunned by the great democracies. The West contributed to the electoral downfall of some of these leaders. When it failed, it engineered their ostracism. Meciar, for instance, won the popular vote twice but is still unable to form a government because both NATO and the European Union made clear that a Slovakia headed by Meciar will be barred from membership and accession. But nowhere is European and American discomfiture and condemnation more evident than in Ukraine and Belarus. Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine's president, has just sacked his government and installed a new, more friendly one, in its place. Kuchma has been accused by the opposition and by the international media of every transgression - from selling radar systems to Iraq to ordering the murder of a journalist. He hasn't visited a single European leader - with the exception of Romano Prodi, the chief of the European Commission - for two years now. Kuchma may attend NATO's Prague summit next week in the teeth of opposition by NATO and a few European governments. Rumors are that he is priming the new prime minister, Viktor Yanukovich, erstwhile governor of the Donetsk region, to replace him as president. Aleksander Lukashenka, the beleaguered president of Belarus should be so lucky. The Czechs flatly refused him an entry visa due to human rights violations in his country. Minsk threatened to sever its diplomatic relations with Prague. The European Union will impose a travel ban tomorrow on Lukashenka and 50 members of his administration. The EU has suspended in 1997 most financial aid and bilateral trade programs with Belarus. In an apparent tit-for-tat Belarus again raised the issue of Chechen refugees on its territory, refused entry by Poland. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been ignoring Belarusian complaints, letting the impoverished country cope with the human flux at its own expense. Lukashenka threatened to open Belarus' anyhow porous borders to unpoliced traffic. According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, in a conference in Washington last week, tellingly titled "Axis of Evil: Belarus - The Missing Link" and hosted by the American Enterprise Institute, the US ambassador to Belarus, Michael Kozak, chastised president Lukashenka for having "chosen the wrong side in the war on terrorism" and threatened that he "will soon face the consequences of his illegal arms sales (and military training) to Iraq." The Polish delegate mocked Lukashenka and his "friends in Baghdad". Poland used to rule west Belarus between the world wars and Poles residing there are staunch supporters of the opposition to the wily president. Belarus implausibly - though vehemently - denies any wrongdoing. Minsk is the target of delegations from every pariah state - from North Korea to Cuba. the Iraqi minister of military industry is a frequent visitor. Belarus has little choice. Boycotted and castigated by the West and multilateral lending institutions, it has to resort to its Soviet-era export markets for trade and investments. The Belarus Act, a proposed bill pending in Congress, would grant massive economic assistance to the fledgling opposition and impose economic sanctions on the much-decried regime. Hitherto supported by an increasingly reluctant Russia, Lukashenka, having expelled the OSCE monitoring and advisory team, remains utterly isolated. Putin, as opposed to his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, rejected a union between Russia and Belarus and instead offered to incorporate the 80,000 sq. miles (208,000 square km.), 10 million people, country in the Russian Federation. If Russia joins the WTO, as it is slated to do in a year or two, its customs union with Belarus will go. All that's left binding this unlikely couple together are two military bases with questionable relevance. The friction between the neighboring duo is growing. Belarus owes Russia at least $80 million for subsidized gas supplies since 1999. An angry Gazprom, the partly state-owned Russian energy behemoth, accuses Belarus of pilfering a staggering 15 billion cubic meters of gas from the transit pipeline in the third quarter alone. In a meeting, last week, between Mikhail Kasyanov, prime minister of Russia and Henadz Navitski, his Belarusian counterpart, Russia agreed to cover c. half the outstanding debt and to renew the flow of critical fuel, halved in the last fortnight. A possible debt-to-equity takeover of the much-coveted and strategically-located Belarusian pipeline network, Beltranshaz, was also discussed. It is an alluring alternative to the Ukrainian route and the Finnish-Baltic North European Gas Pipeline. The Belarusian potash industry is another likely target once - or if - privatization sinks in. Should Gazprom cease to sell to Belarus gas at the heavily subsidized Russian prices, the country will grind to a halt. Other suppliers, such as Itera, have already cut their supply by half. Belarus' decrepit industries, still state-owned, centrally planned and managed by old-timers, rely on heavy-handed government subventionary, interventionary and protectionist policies. Heavy machinery, clunky and shoddy consumer goods and petrochemicals constitute the bulk of Belarusian exports. Strolling the drab, though tidy, streets of soot-suffused Minsk, it is hard to believe that Belarus was once one of the most prosperous parts of the USSR. The average income was 1.2 times the Soviet Union's. GDP per capita was 1.5 times the average. Yet, Belarus has rejected transition. It tolerated only a negligible private sector and mistreated foreign investors. It is even harder to believe that Lukashenka was once a zealous fighter against corruption in his country. He won the 1994 presidential elections on a "clean hands" ticket, being an obscure state farm director and then a crusading member of parliament. Re-elected in tainted elections in 2001, Lukashenka has imposed a reign of ambient terror on his countrymen. Human rights abuses and mysterious disappearances of dissidents abound. The president's "market socialism" is replete with five year plans, quotas, and a nomenclature of venal politicians and rent seeking managers. The BBC reports that "farmers are being encouraged to grow bumper harvests for the reward of a free carpet or TV set from the state." The Economist reported, earlier this year, mass arrests of non-supportive company directors. Some people are afraid to criticize the regime and for good reason. But what the Western media consistently neglect to mention is that many Belarusians are content. As opposed to other countries in transition, until fairly recently, both salaries and pensions - though meager even by east European standards - were paid on time. GDP per capita is a respectable $3000 - three fifths the Czech Republic's and Hungary's. Official unemployment is 2 percent, though, with underemployment, it is probably closer to 10-15 percent, or half Poland's. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica 2002 Yearbook, Russia spends c. $1 billion annually to subsidize Belarusian energy consumption and to purchase unwant |
